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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
CAROLYN L. RAY, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
CaseNo.990049-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.20.040. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues for Review. 
1. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, was the initial contact between 
the defendant and police a level one consensual encounter? 
2. Did the initial contact ripen into a level two encounter when the police officer 
obtained identification from the defendant and briefly retained that identification to request 
dispatch to run a warrants check on the defendant? 
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3. If a level two encounter occurred between the defendant and police, did the 
trial court commit error in finding that there were sufficient objective, articulable facts present to 
justify an investigatory stop? 
4. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, did the trial court commit error 
in finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her bags? 
Standard of Review. 
The first two issues stated above present singular questions of law. With regard to 
questions of law, the trial court is given little discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's 
conclusions of law are accorded little deference by the reviewing court and are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1991). However, the third and fourth issues stated present mixed questions of law and fact. 
Such questions require a bifurcated standard of review. When determining whether reasonable 
suspicion existed or whether a defendant consented to a search, limited deference is accorded to 
the trial court's factual findings and the trial court's application of those findings to the legal 
standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). The trial court's findings and the application 
of the findings to the legal standard will not be upset unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Nevertheless, the trial court's ultimate conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed or that 
consent to search was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.20.040 states in pertinent part: 
A. It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia.... 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Carolyn L. Ray, was charged by Information with possession of drug 
paraphernalia on May 27,1998, in violation of § 11.20.040 of the Salt Lake City Code. On 
July 16,1998, the defendant appeared at an arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charge. Following entry of the plea, a pretrial conference hearing was conducted and a motion 
to suppress was scheduled. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 6,1998. The trial 
judge, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, denied the motion on October 30,1998. A document 
setting forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law was signed on November 17, 
1998. The defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest on December 21,1998, and was 
sentenced the same day. The defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 7,1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the morning of May 27, 1998, the defendant entered the 
Quality Quick Stop located at 910 North 900 West in Salt Lake City. She proceeded to purchase 
a few items and then walked outside the store and stood in front of the store ostensibly to wait on 
a ride to work. The defendant had been carrying two tote-type bags with her and had sat them 
next to her in front of the store. The store night clerk noticed that the defendant had been 
standing outside the store for approximately two hours and that she had repeatedly looked 
through the store window. The night clerk told the manager this information. R. 117 at 24. The 
store manager had also noticed the defendant standing outside the store and that she kept looking 
back through the store window. Since he was attempting to gain access to the store safe, this 
conduct seemed suspicious. He also noticed that the defendant's whole body was shaking, and 
he thought that she was on some sort of drugs. R. 117 at 24. As result of these observations, the 
store manager called the police. R. 117 at 24. 
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Officer Eldard of the Salt Lake City Police was the first officer to arrive. He responded 
to a dispatch call that a suspicious female had been standing outside the Quick Stop for 
approximately 2 hours and that the store manager thought that she might be on drugs. R. 117 at 
3. Officer Eldard saw the defendant still standing in front of the store. R. 117 at 4. Based on the 
dispatch call, Officer Eldard decided to approach the defendant and speak with her. In response 
to Officer Eldard's questions, the defendant stated that she was waiting on a ride to work. 
Initially, the defendant told Officer Eldard that she had been outside the store for approximately 
30 minutes. After verifying with the store manager that the defendant had been outside for 2 
hours, Officer Eldard asked the defendant for identification, which she voluntarily produced. R. 
117 at 4-5. 
During this brief conversation, Officer Eldard noticed that the defendant appeared 
nervous. She shifted her weight from one foot to the other. Her speech was fast and she would 
look around nervously. Officer Eldard concluded that either the defendant was "nervous in 
dealing with the police or that she might have been coming down off some sort of drug...." R. 
117 at 6, Officer Eldard took the defendant's identification with him to his patrol car and called 
dispatch with the information for a warrants check. The warrants check took approximately 5 
minutes. R. 117 at 11. During the few minutes while the warrants check was in process, Officer 
Jones, who arrived on scene shortly after Officer Eldard, spoke to the defendant. R. 117 at 5. 
Officer Jones, like Officer Eldard, was dressed in a standard police uniform and driving a 
marked patrol car. In response to Officer Jones' questions, the defendant stated that she had been 
waiting outside the store for approximately 2 or 2Vi hours for a ride to work. R. 117 at 16, 21. 
Officer Jones noticed the two bags sitting at the defendant's feet. Since Officer Jones was 
familiar with the area being an area known for drug offenses, he asked the defendant if the bags 
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were hers. Upon her affirmative answer, Officer Jones asked the defendant if she had anything in 
the bags that she shouldn't have. The defendant replied that she did not. Officer Jones then 
asked the defendant if he could look in the bags and the defendant consented. R. 117 at 16-17. 
Almost immediately Officer Jones located drug paraphernalia in one of the bags, and was still 
searching the second bag when Officer Eldard returned from his patrol car. Officer Jones 
discovered additional drug paraphernalia in the second bag and on the defendant's person when 
searched incident to arrest. The defendant was cited for the violation and released. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The initial contact between Officer Eldard and the defendant was a level one consensual 
encounter. At no time did Officer Eldard use any tactic or show of force, actual or implied, that 
would indicate to an ordinary, reasonable person that absent the defendant's cooperation then his 
requests would be compelled. The defendant freely provided her identification to Officer Eldard 
and waited in the spirit of cooperation while he requested dispatch to run a warrants check. 
Officer Jones, who arrived after Officer Eldard, requested to search the defendant's bags. That 
consent was freely and voluntarily given and incriminating evidence was found. At no time prior 
to the drug paraphernalia being found did the encounter between the officers and the defendant 
escalate to a level two encounter, for which reasonable suspicion would be required. However, 
should the court determine that the encounter did escalate to a level two encounter, then the 
officers had knowledge of reasonable, objective, articulable facts to justify the detention. Even 
under these circumstances, the consent of the defendant to search her bags was freely and 
voluntarily given and the evidence is admissible. Therefore, the defendant's conviction of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of § 11.20.040 of the Salt 
Lake City Code, should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE OFFICERS AND THE DEFENDANT 
WAS A LEVEL ONE CONSENTIAL ENCOUNTER NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE FACT THAT THE INITIAL OFFICER OBTAINED THE DEFENDANT'S 
IDENTIFICATION AND RETAINED THAT IDENTIFICATION WHILE HE 
RAN A WARRANTS CHECK ON THE DEFENDANT. 
A citizen/police encounter has once again proven itself to be the fertile soil of a search 
and seizure analysis. To assist in the analysis, Utah law has identified three levels of 
constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and the public. State v. Smith, 
781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). In a level one 
encounter, a police officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his or her will. In a level two encounter, a police officer may seize 
a person if the officer is able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime. However, the detention in a level two encounter must be temporary 
and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the initial seizure. A level three 
encounter is an arrest of the person by the officer based upon probable cause to believe that the 
person has committed or is in the process of committing a crime. 
Perhaps as recognition of the mobility of our society, most of the cases where hairs must 
be split in the determination of which level encounter occurred involve the stop of an automobile. 
Further, most of the cases upon which the defendant relies involve vehicle stops. However, this 
case does not involve a vehicle stop and the distinction makes a difference. In her brief, the 
defendant asserts that it is well established in law that she was seized when the officer retained 
her identification for the purpose of conducting the warrants check. The defendant further asserts 
that courts have universally recognized that this police conduct effects a seizure of the person 
6 
because a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away leaving their identification with the 
officer. Under the facts and circumstances of this case these assertions are not correct statements 
of the law. In addition, the seemingly small step suggested by these erroneous assertions 
requires a giant leap in logic. 
In support of her broad-brush assertions, the defendant cites and quotes from several 
cases. For example, the defendant cites Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), a traffic stop 
case; State v. Burch. 153 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), a traffic stop case; United States v. Walker. 
933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991), a traffic stop case; United States v. Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356 (11th 
Cir. 1983), a traffic stop case; and State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), yet 
another traffic stop case, This is not an exhaustive list, the defendant also cites other traffic stop 
cases which I have not referred to because the point is made. Once a vehicle is stopped for some 
sort of traffic code violation, the defendants and passengers in that vehicle are already involved 
in a level two encounter. That is, they are seized then and there. That's why they wouldn't feel 
free to just walk away. But that's not this case. As I said earlier, this case does not involve a 
traffic stop and the distinction makes a difference. So lets take a step back to a point before the 
defendant suggests that we take such a giant leap of faith based on the faulty assertions. 
In State v. Bean7 869 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), an officer stopped two juvenile 
pedestrians while looking for male suspects in the general area. The officer noted that the two 
individuals appeared to be very young and suspected a curfew violation. The officer also 
detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath. The officer requested 
identification, which he voluntarily received, and ran a warrants check. The defendant had an 
outstanding warrant. A second officer had arrived on scene during the early phases of the 
encounter. Both officers were dressed in standard police uniforms and were driving marked 
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police vehicles. During further conversations with the officers, the defendant admitted that he 
had consumed an alcoholic beverage. He was arrested. The Court of Appeals held first, that the 
initial encounter was a level one voluntary encounter and second, that the officer had reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the defendant had committed an offense justifying further detention. 
The defendant cites Bean for the proposition that "The test for when a seizure occurred is 
objective and depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police 
officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave." 869 P.2d at 986. While the language quoted 
is a little confusing, it seems to stand for the proposition that the test has a subjective element 
regarding whether the defendant feels detained but that this subjective element must be 
objectively reasonable. That is, objective criteria must be present which would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that they were, in fact, detained. All of this supports a conclusion that the test 
is highly fact specific. Which comports with the conclusion that a panel of this court reached in 
State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Menke. the court discussed the three 
levels of police/citizen encounters and quoting State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah 1987) 
concluded, "These demarcations are easy to list but often difficult to apply. Consequently, we 
must not only balance the competing interests of the individual and the State but also carefully 
consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case." 787 P.2d at 540. The Bean court 
then in footnote three specifically addressed the fact that the defendant in that case was a 
pedestrian. The court stated, "However, we note that while an officer's taking of identification 
or car registration and running a warrants check after the stop of an automobile have been found 
to constitute seizures...an officer's taking of identification without a vehicle stop does not 
necessarily constitute a seizure." The court then cites State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 
1987) and State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Both of these cases did not 
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involve traditional vehicle traffic stops. Rather, in both cases the initial contacts were while the 
defendants were pedestrians. 
Deitman was the case in which the Utah Supreme Court adopted the three-level approach 
for the analysis of police/citizen encounters. In that case, police responded to a burglar alarm 
and observed a vehicle pull away from across the street. An officer followed the vehicle until it 
stopped at a residence a few blocks away. The defendant and another male exited the vehicle. 
The officer, parked across the street, called out to the men and asked to speak to them. They 
responded by crossing the street to the police vehicle and when requested by the officer produced 
identification. The officer then used their identification to request dispatch to run a warrants 
check on the men. Neither was arrested at that time. Later, officers returned to the residence 
where the vehicle was still parked and contacted the men, who agreed to talk to the officers. 
Permission was granted to the officers to look into the vehicle. Incriminating evidence was 
observed in the vehicle and the men were arrested. 
On appeal, the defendants asserted that the evidence should have been suppressed 
because the police lacked probable cause to effectuate the stop. After adopting the three-level 
approach, the court noted that the initial contact was a level one encounter. This initial contact 
included the pedestrian approach, the request for identification which was voluntarily produced, 
and the use of that identification to request that dispatch run a warrants check. The court pointed 
out that the "defendants were not stopped by the officer and raised no objection when the officer 
asked if he could talk to them. They crossed the street, produced identification on request, and 
were not detained against their will." The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
suppress the evidence. 
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In the present matter, the initial contact with the defendant was a pedestrian approach. 
Officer Eldard requested identification, which the defendant voluntarily produced. Officer 
Eldard then used that identification to request that dispatch run a warrants check on the 
defendant. There is no evidence in the record that the defendant's responses were anything other 
than in the spirit of cooperation. The fact pattern in this case is the same as in Deitman. The 
entire initial contact with the defendant in this case was a level one encounter. 
The Jackson case also involved a pedestrian approach. In Jackson, the defendant was 
driving a vehicle that matched the description of a vehicle involved in a robbery. A police 
officer followed the defendant for the purpose of running a license plate check. However, before 
the plate check could be run, the defendant pulled into a parking lot and exited the vehicle. The 
police officer also pulled into the parking lot and the defendant approached the police vehicle on 
foot. The officer parked his vehicle, exited and walked towards the defendant. The officer 
requested identification, which the defendant voluntarily produced. Following some questioning, 
the officer determined that the defendant's driver's license had been suspended. Further, the 
license plate check revealed that the plate was stolen. The defendant was arrested. 
On appeal, the defendant in Jackson argued that he had been seized when the officer 
requested identification. The court characterized the issue as whether the officer, by asking for 
the identification, was detaining the defendant against his will. The court answered in the 
negative. The court then quoted from United States v. Castellanos, 731 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) that "as a matter of law, a request for identification cannot constitute a show of authority 
sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure. Only when police have in some way 
restrained the liberty of an individual, either by force or a show of authority, is there a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment." 731 F.2d at 982-983. The Castellanos court 
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concluded that the presence of the police and their request for identification would not have led a 
reasonable person to conclude that he or she was being compelled to respond; and further, that 
the police officer's failure to inform the defendant that he need not respond to any questions did 
not convert the encounter into a seizure. 731 F.2d at 983-984. 
The court in Jackson also discussed United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544 (1980), a 
case cited by the defendant for its holding that a person is seized for fourth amendment purposes 
if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave." 446 U.S. at 554. In her appellate brief, the defendant 
attempts to bootstrap the argument that simply running the warrants check constituted a seizure 
under Mendenhall. That argument ignores the very guidance given by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Mendenhall itself. As noted in Jackson, the Supreme Court in Mendenhall cited several 
circumstances that could indicate a seizure. For example, the threatening presence of several 
officers; the display of a weapon by an officer; some physical touching of the person by an 
officer; or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled. None of these circumstances were present in the case at issue. The 
only cited circumstance that is even remotely in the picture is the presence of more than one 
officer. While two officers were eventually on the scene, they did not arrive together and 
nothing in the record indicates that the officers' presence was threatening. Further, the Deitman 
case clearly indicated that using identification furnished by the defendant to run a warrants check 
was not sufficient, even with the other factors, to make the initial contact anything more than a 
level one encounter. Although the defendant cites other cases in support of this aspect of her 
argument, she falls into the same trap as before by citing vehicle traffic stop cases. The 
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defendants in those cases were already seized. Therefore, the cited excerpts referred to by the 
defendant are not on point with the facts and circumstances of this case. 
As can be seen from Deitman and Jackson, under the facts and circumstances of the 
present case the initial contact between Officer Eldard and the defendant, including the 
pedestrian approach, request for identification, and use of that identification to request that 
dispatch run a warrants check, was a level one encounter. Officer Eldard approached the 
defendant in a non-aggressive manner. Yes, he was wearing the standard police uniform and 
driving a marked police vehicle - the same as we all see police officers every day going about 
their duties. Officer Eldard spoke to the defendant and asked her about her presence. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Officer Eldard used anything but a friendly, courteous tone 
of voice when he spoke to the defendant. Certainly, no evidence suggests that Officer Eldard 
was overbearing or aggressive. Nothing suggests that Officer Eldard's demeanor, approach or 
words communicated to the defendant that compliance with his requests might be compelled. 
The defendant then gave Officer Eldard an incredulous story. She said that she was simply 
waiting on a ride to work - for over two hours. The officer then requested identification, which 
the defendant freely provided, and then he stepped back to the police vehicle to have dispatch run 
a warrants check. There is no evidence that the defendant felt that she was being detained 
against her will while Officer Eldard conducted the warrants check using the identification she 
freely provided. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant feared that unless she cooperated 
the requests of the officers would be compelled. The defendant never objected to Officer 
Eldard's request for identification, never asked to leave, never asked for the return of her 
identification so that she could leave, never objected to Officer Eldard using the identification to 
run a warrants check, never objected to the time being taken to run the warrants check, or ever 
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stated that it was time for her to find another way to work. In fact, had her ""ride to work" 
materialized at any time during the few minutes the initial encounter and warrants check took, 
she would have been free to leave. Indeed, as the officers testified, had the defendant asked to 
leave, or even looked at the Officers in a manner that communicated that she wanted to leave, she 
would have been free to do so. R. 117 at 12-13. The objective evidence supports the fact that 
the defendant remained in the spirit of cooperation, nothing more. Therefore, the defendant was 
not seized for fourth amendment purposes by the actions of Officer Eldard and was free to leave 
at any time up until the search of her bags revealed the drug paraphernalia. 
POINT 2. 
EVEN IF THE POLICE/CITIZEN ENCOUNTER IN THE PRESENT 
CASE EVOLVED INTO A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER, THE OFFICERS 
WERE JUSTIFIED IN THEIR ACTIONS BECAUSE SUFFICIENT 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE, ARTICULABLE FACTS WERE PRESENT TO 
SUPPORT A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
When Officer Eldard approached the defendant outside the Quick Mart, she had already 
been standing there for over two hours acting, in the opinion of the store clerk, in a suspicious 
manner and, as he had reported to dispatch, appeared to be on drugs. The defendant had entered 
the store carrying two tote-type bags and, after purchasing some items, stood outside repeatedly 
looking back inside the store as the manager attempted to open the store safe. When the officers 
asked the defendant about her presence, she gave them an inconsistent and incredulous story. 
She said that she was simply waiting on a ride to work - for over two hours. So, Officer Eldard 
knew the following objective articulable facts before he asked the defendant for her 
identification: 1) the store manager reported that a woman had been standing outside the store for 
over two hours; 2) that the woman had been acting in a suspicious manner and appeared to be on 
drugs; 3) when Officer Eldard arrived there she was; 4) she appeared either overly nervous when 
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approached by Officer Eldard, who was dressed the same as we all see police officers going 
about their everyday duties, or as though coming down from drugs; 5) when asked about her 
presence, the defendant at first stated that she had been waiting for only about 30 minutes, which 
was inconsistent with the store managers report as well as later statements by the defendant; and 
6) the defendant gave Officer Eldard an incredulous story. 
In State v. Rodrigiiez-Lopi. 954 P.2d 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), police officers observed 
the defendant drive an automobile into the parking lane and lean over to talk to two known 
prostitutes. The officers turned on their overhead lights to stop the defendant, not for a specific 
traffic violation but because they considered his driving pattern to be unusual. Instead of 
stopping immediately, the defendant drove on for about a block. During this time, the defendant 
and his passenger made movements consistent with an attempt to hide something under the seat. 
Now the officers had not only an unusual driving pattern, but also suspicious behavior. After the 
< 
stop, a gun was found under the seat and a package of cocaine was found protruding from the 
defendant's shirt pocket. At trial, and on appeal, the defendant argued that the officers did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. 
The court noted that it would review the trial court's determination of reasonable 
suspicion for correctness. State v. ContreL 886 P.2dl07, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, 
the court continued, citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994), that "the reasonable-
suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts." The trial court in the case determined that a 
"sufficient number of suspicious circumstances occurred that, taken in their totality, justified an 
investigatory stop." The court characterized the actions of the defendant as "unusual conduct" 
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that would "lead a reasonable person to conclude 'that criminal activity may be afoot.'" 
(Emphasis added.) The court upheld the investigatory stop as justified. 
In State v. Yoden 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), police officers were investigating 
the disappearance of a child. Ultimately, the defendant was charged with child kidnapping and 
sexual abuse of a child. A search of the balcony of the defendant's apartment turned up evidence 
that the defendant sought to suppress. The defendant asserted that the police did not have 
objective facts to support the search, but were acting on "hunches" and "premonitions." At the 
suppression hearing, the officers testified that three factors led them to initially approach the 
defendant. First, the victim's clothing was found near the defendant's apartment building; 
second, the defendant's apartment was one of only two that had the interior lights on; and third, 
several citizens reported to the police that while the police and a crowd were gathering, the 
defendant paced back and forth from the apartment and balcony acting suspicious and looking 
nervous. Based on this information, the officers approached the defendant for information. The 
defendant told the officers that he had been asleep and had just awakened. This statement was 
incredulous to the officers as it conflicted with their impressions upon viewing him and with the 
reported observations from citizens. Further, while talking to the officers, the defendant was 
evasive and appeared to be very nervous. 
The court noted that while the defendant's nervous or suspicious behavior is insufficient 
by itself to establish probable cause, it may be considered in conjunction with other factors. In 
fact, the court noted that it has held that responses by a suspect which an officer knows to be 
false, or which are "implausible, conflicting, evasive or unresponsive" may, when considered 
together with the prior suspicious behavior, be sufficient to constitute probable cause. Since the 
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officers did not rely solely on the defendant's nervous and suspicious behavior, the court upheld 
the trial court's determination. 
In the present case, the unusual conduct of the defendant by standing outside the store for 
over two hours with no apparent legitimate business, her suspicious behavior in repeatedly 
looking back into the store while the manager attempted to open the store safe, her nervousness 
when approached by police, her appearance suggesting possible drug use, and incredulous 
response to Officer Eldard's questions were sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. These 
circumstances are equivalent to or exceed the circumstances found to justify the investigatory 
stop in Rodriguez-Lopi and the warrantless search in Yoder. The fact that the officers testified in 
response to defense questions that at the time they initially approached the defendant they knew 
of no specific offenses the defendant had committed or was about to commit, is of no moment. 
The critical point is that the officers were aware of objective, articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that criminal activity may be afoot. The requirement isn't whether the officers knew of 
a specific offense the defendant had committed or was preparing to commit, but rather, whether 
there was supportable suspicion that the defendant may be involved in any criminal activity. 
Therefore, even should the court determine that the initial level one encounter evolved to a level 
two encounter when Officer Eldard used the defendant's identification to run a warrants check, 
under the totality of the circumstances a level two investigatory stop was justified. 
In her brief, the defendant recognizes that officers may run a warrants check in the case of 
a level two encounter, so long as the detention is temporary and reasonably brief. Salt Lake City 
v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the present case, the detention was temporary 
and reasonably brief as far as the warrants check was concerned. Further, all of the time spent in 
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that endeavor was with the cooperation of the defendant. The additional time associated with the 
search of her bags was with the consent of the defendant. Therefore, any seizure that occurred 
was reasonable and justified. Of course, if the encounter never ripened into a level two 
encounter, then the determination by the trial court that the officers did have sufficient objective, 
articulable facts to justify the seizure was harmless error. 
POINT 3. 
THE SEARCH WHICH LOCATED THE DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
IN THE TOTE-TYPE BAGS OF THE DEFENDANT WAS PERFORMED 
WITH THE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT AND AS THERE WAS NO PRIOR 
POLICE MISCONDUCT OR SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PURPOSES, THE SEARCH WAS VALID AND THE EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE. 
The defendant argues that her consent to search her bags was not voluntary on two points, 
?irst, the defendant argues that the doctrine of exploitation operates to invalidate her consent. 
Tie exploitation doctrine holds that consent obtained by the exploitation of a prior illegality that 
ises to the level of a violation of the Fourth Amendment is invalid. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 
256 (Utah 1993). However, the defendant's contention that there was a prior illegality based 
pon Officer Eldard's "seizure" of her, as discussed in Points 1 and 2 above, is pure fantasy, 
econd, the defendant argues that under the facts and circumstances of this case the conduct of 
le officers constituted such a show of force that her consent was involuntary. Let's see now, 
rtiat would the conduct be that the defendant asserts as a show of force? Well first, it would be 
lat a police officer, clothed in a standard police uniform, "the badge, gun, the whole works," 
riving a standard marked police vehicle, approached her. Then this police officer spoke to her 
rid asked her about standing around outside the store for over two hours. He then asked her for 
lentification and took that identification back to his vehicle! And then another police officer 
rrived, and he too was wearing a uniform, a badge and a gun! And he also was driving a 
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marked police vehicle! The defendant's brief then asserts that this "surely must have frightened 
Ms. Ray and led her to believe that she was in trouble." Therefore, the defendant concludes, all 
of this created an "atmosphere of coerciveness." 
The position of the defendant approaches a point that every police/citizen encounter 
strikes such fear and apprehension in the hearts of the ordinary citizen that nothing thereafter is 
consensual. This approach is as wrongheaded in fact and policy as it is in law. What did the 
defendant expect? That the police officers would be wearing clown suits and driving the 
Wienermobile? Of course they are going to be wearing a standard police uniform, which 
includes a badge and gun, and driving a standard marked police vehicle! All of us see police 
officers everyday so attired and driving such vehicles going about their regular duties. To say 
that this and the fact that they asked her about her suspicious conduct, requested identification 
and ran a warrants check created such fear and apprehension in the defendant that her will was 
overborne and her consent to search was invalid is, to say the least, absurd. The evidence 
obtained from the search in this case is good fruit from a good tree. 
In State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court considered a claim 
that police conduct amounted to coercion sufficient to invalidate a consent to search. Minutes 
following a shooting, police officers received information that the possible suspects had fled into 
a particular house. Officers called for backup and eventually approached the house in strength 
with weapons drawn. A man later identified as James Archuleta, the defendant's father and 
owner of the house, was observed watching television. Fully uniformed officers ("badge, gun, 
the whole works") with guns drawn and pointed at him in a threatening manner, ordered him out 
of the house and directed him to lay face down in the grass. He was subjected to a pat-down 
search for weapons, and was found to not be in possession of any weapon. Only then did officers 
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either holster their guns or hold them in a non-threatening manner. Mr. Archuleta provided the 
officers with information and allowed them to search the house. Although the first search did not 
disclose any evidence, a second search conducted a short while later did result in incriminating 
evidence against the defendant. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the 
product of consent to search that resulted from duress or coercion, either directly or by show of 
force. 
The court noted that at no time did the officers assert to Mr. Archuleta that they had the 
authority to search the house. Rather, they merely requested his permission. Further, the officers 
did not use trickery or deception to obtain his consent to search. The court concluded that the 
consent was not the product of a show of force. Rather, by the time of the consent to search, the 
initial show of force was over and its effect had dissipated. After all, by this time the guns were 
back in their holsters! 
The court also reviewed the factors relevant to the determination of whether consent was 
voluntary in State v. Bredehoft 966 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Bredehoft was a DUI case 
in which the defendant attempted to suppress the results of a chemical test performed on a blood 
sample. The defendant asserted that the consent to the blood draw was not voluntary. The 
defendant was in an ambulance and was informed by the Trooper that he was requesting a blood 
sample for law enforcement purposes. The defendant cooperated. He did not resist, struggle, say 
"No," or object in any way. He didn't request that a less intrusive breathalyser test be used. 
Instead, he simply stuck out his arm to the ambulance personnel and permitted his blood to be 
drawn. 
The court pointed to five specific factors as providing guidance. First, there was no claim 
of authority to search by the officers; second, there was no exhibition of force by the officers; 
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third, the officers made a mere request to search; fourth, the party being search cooperated; and 
fifth, the officers did not use deception or trick. In the present case, the officers did not assert 
that they had the authority to search the defendant's bags absent her consent. There was no 
exhibition of force by the officers. The assertion by the defendant that the mere presence of 
uniformed officers driving marked police vehicles somehow constitutes a show of force is 
absurd. If there was no show of force in Archuleta sufficient to render the consent to search in 
that case invalid, then there can be no question regarding the issue in the present case. The 
officers merely requested that the defendant allow them to search her bags; a request that she 
could have refused. Instead, the defendant cooperated by allowing the officers to search. In fact, 
throughout the entire episode the defendant exhibited a spirit of cooperation. Lastly, the officers 
did not use any sort of deception or trick to obtain the defendant's consent to search her bags. 
The totality of all the surrounding circumstances in the present case clearly demonstrates that the 
defendant's consent to search her bags was freely and voluntarily given. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the defendant's 
conviction for the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor in 
violation of § 11.20.040 of the Salt Lake City Code, be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 2 / ^ S i a y of July, 1999. 
DON M. WRYE (#35^) 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff / Appellee 
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